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Within entanglement theory there are criteria which certify that some quantum states cannot be
distilled into pure entanglement. An example is the positive partial transposition criterion. Here
we present, for the first time, the analogous thing for secret correlations. We introduce a com-
putable criterion which certifies that a probability distribution between two honest parties and an
eavesdropper cannot be (asymptotically) distilled into a secret key. The existence of non-distillable
correlations with positive secrecy cost, also known as bound information, is an open question. This
criterion may be the key for finding bound information. However, if it turns out that this criterion
does not detect bound information, then, a very interesting consequence follows: any distribution
with positive secrecy cost can increase the secrecy content of another distribution. In other words,
all correlations with positive secrecy cost constitute a useful resource.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretic cryptology started with Shan-
non [20], and it established that secret communication
relied entirely on secret key; but not until Wyner’s fa-
mous wiretap paper [23] was it recognized that noise in
the eavesdropper’s channel can be used to establish se-
crecy in a communication. The secrecy capacity of what
is now called the general wiretap channel was determined
in [7]. After that, again, it took some while before the
distillation of key from given correlation PABE between
two cooperating players, Alice (A) and Bob (B), and an
eavesdropper Eve (E) was considered [2, 16], in a model
where the three parties share a large number of copies
of the given distribution PABE , and Alice and Bob can
freely exchange messages over an authenticated but pub-
lic channel (i.e., monitored by Eve).
Indeed, Maurer [16] showed that this scenario is much
richer than the one of the wiretap channel. His paper
posed the problem of determining the optimal secret key
rate of any given distribution PABE , in the discrete mem-
oryless setting of availability of asymptotically many in-
dependent samples of the distribution, and in particular
the problem of deciding whether a distribution can be
distilled into a secret key or not.
There has by now been a long history of fruitful ex-
change of ideas between cryptography and entanglement
theory (see e.g. [3]), mostly relating protocols for secret
key and entanglement distillation. In the quantum case,
the reverse process was considerred in [3]: create a quan-
tum state from pure entanglement with maximum effi-
ciency. Subsequently it was shown that there exist states
that require a positive rate of entanglement to be cre-
ated, but yield no pure entanglement at all under any
distillation procedure. These states are called bound en-
tanglement [9, 21]. The key to show the existence of
bound entanglement is the positive partial transposition
criterion [18], which certifies that a given state is not
distillable.
This motivated Gisin and Wolf [8] to speculate on the
existence of bound information, i.e. distributions that
yield no secret key under distillation but nevertheless
somehow contain secrecy. They presented some candi-
dates for bound information derived from bound entan-
gled quantum states. Subsequently, the notion of secret
key cost of a given distribution PABE was formalised (un-
der the name information of formation) [19]. Roughly
speaking, this is the minimum amount of secret bits that
are necessary in order to generate PABE from public
communication. Latter, a single-letter formula for this
quantity was found [22].
Renner and Wolf [19] have shown that there can be ar-
bitrarily large gaps between the secret key cost and the
key distillation rate, thus providing evidence for the ex-
istence of bound information (see also [22]). In [1, 13] it
was shown that multipartite (i.e., more than two honest
players) bound information indeed exists. But nothing
is known about the existence of bound information in
the bipartite case. The reason is that no criterion for
non-distillability of secret correlations is known. In this
paper we present the first one, which is based on the idea
presented in [14, 15].
II. NOTATION
Key distillation and key cost are most conveniently ex-
pressed via the probability distribution from which Alice,
Bob and Eve observe samples. A generic multipartite
probability distribution among the parties AB. . . is de-
noted by a non-negative vector PAB... belonging to the
R-linear space HA ⊗HB ⊗ · · · which comes with a dis-
tinguished (tensor product) basis. This distinguished,
“computational”, basis of the local space HA has one
element for each outcome from the alphabet of A. For
instance, the computational basis of a bit B consists of
the two vectors (1, 0) and (0, 1). Note that for generic
alphabets we use H to denote the vector space, but for
bits (two dimensions) we reserve B. Furthermore, to
2identify which party has access to the sample from a fac-
tor in the tensor product, we attach generic indices A, B
and E; if the space of one party consists of several alpha-
bets, we denote them A, A′, A′′, etc. The coefficients of
PAB... in the computational (product) basis are denoted
by PAB...(a, b, . . .), and each corresponds to the proba-
bility of the event with outcomes (a, b . . .). Hence all
the coefficients of PAB... must be non-negative. Unless
explicitly mentioned, we allow probability distributions
PAB... to be not normalized.
A general (stochastic) operationM, which may be fil-
tering (i.e., not preserving probability), is represented by
a linear map with non-negative coefficients M : H1 →
H2. Because we do not care about normalization, there
is no additional constraint on the coefficients ofM, apart
from non-negativity. In the case of local operations, we
specify which party performs each operation by attach-
ing an appropriate index, e.g. MANB. We omit the
tensor product sign, and the identity matrix for the re-
maining parties.
III. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
The secret bit fraction was introduced in [12], as the
secrecy analog of the quantum singlet fraction, intro-
duced in [11].
Definition 1 (secret bit fraction). Suppose PABE
is a tripartite normalized probability distribution, where
the outcomes corresponding to parties A and B take val-
ues on {0, 1}. The secret bit fraction of PABE , denoted
λ[PABE ], is the maximum value of µ for which a decom-
position
PABE = µSABP
′
E + (1− µ)P
′′
ABE (1)
exists, where P ′E and P
′′
ABE are arbitrary normalized dis-
tributions, and S is a secret bit shared by two parties:
S(a, b) = 12δa,b.
Lemma 2. The secret bit fraction of PABE can be
written as
λ[PABE ] = 2
∑
emin{PABE(0, 0, e), PABE(1, 1, e)}∑
a,b,e PABE(a, b, e)
.
(2)
This is proven in [12]. We have included the normal-
ization factor in the denominator of (2) in order not to
worry about the normalization of PABE ; in this way,
the quantity λ[PABE ] makes sense irrespective of nor-
malization of PABE . Note that λ[PABE ] = 1 means that
PABE = SABP
′
E , so that PABE represents a secret bit
between Alice and Bob.
Definition 3. The maximal extractable secret bit
fraction of a given distribution PABE ∈ HA⊗HB⊗HE
is
Λ[PABE ] = sup
MA,NB
λ[MANBPABE ] , (3)
where the optimization is made over maps
MA : HA → B and NB : HB → B.
Note that the function λ[PABE ] is only defined for dis-
tributions PABE where the alphabets of A,B are {0, 1},
hence, in the definition of Λ, it is important that the
range of the maps MA,MB is B. On the other hand,
the function Λ is defined on probability distributions
PABE for random variables taking values on arbitrary
alphabets. The maximal extractable secret bit fraction
expresses the quality of the secret bit that can be ex-
tracted from a single copy of a given distribution. If
Λ[PABE ] = 1 then a perfect secret bit can be extracted
from a single copy of PABE . If PABE is the product
of two uniformly random bits (one for each of the hon-
est parties) and any uncorrelated information for Eve,
then Λ[PABE ] = 1/2. Because the output of the maps
MA,MB can always be an independent uniform random
bit, irrespectively of the input, the range of Λ is [1/2, 1].
It is shown in [12] that the quantity Λ is a secrecy mono-
tone, and hence, constitutes a measure of the amount of
secrecy contained in a given PABE . Additionally, there
is a relation between this single-copy secrecy measure
and asymptotic distillability. It is shown in [12] that if
Λ[PABE ] > 1/2 then PABE is distillable. In what follows
we rephrase the definition of distillability in terms of Λ.
Definition 4 (Distillability). We say that
the distribution PABE ∈ HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE is
(secret-key-)distillable if for each λ0 ∈ [1/2, 1) there ex-
ists an integer n such that Λ[P⊗nABE ] > λ0.
That is, from a sufficiently large number of copies of
PABE , Alice and Bob can, by local operations and pub-
lic communication (which, without loss of generality, can
be assumed to be a filtering of the form written in (3)),
obtain arbitrarily good approximations to a secret bit.
If there exists n such that Λ[P⊗nABE ] > 1/2, one can ap-
ply advantage distillation [16] to the result and obtain
a secret key (see [12]). Note furthermore that in this
case even positive rates of secret key can be obtained, as
n→∞. (The reader familiar with entanglement theory
will realize the similarity of these concepts to singlet frac-
tion and singlet distillability.) The difficulty in dealing
with distillability is that its definition involves an arbi-
trarily large number of copies of PABE . The following
tools deal with this problem.
Lemma 5. Let H1, H2 and H3 be given vector
spaces. Any “global” linear map M : H1 ⊗ H2 →
H3 with non-negative coefficients can be decomposed
into a local linear map with non-negative coefficients,
M′ : H1 → H3 ⊗ H2 (which depends on M), and a
simple global linear map with non-negative coefficients,
U : (H3 ⊗ H2) ⊗ H2 → H3 (which is independent of
M, that is, universal, and given by Uy3x3x2y2 = δ
y3
x3
δx2y2),
such that M = UM′.
Proof. If we adopt the convention that lower indices cor-
respond to the input and upper indices to the output, we
3can write M′ in terms of M as M′x3x2x1 = M
x3
x1x2
. The
equality
My3x1y2 =
∑
x2x3y
′
2
Uy3
x3x2y
′
2
(
M′x3x2x1 δ
y′
2
y2
)
, (4)
holds by definition. ✷
Lemma 6. If the distribution PABE ∈
HA ⊗HB ⊗HE is distillable, then for each λ0 ∈ [1/2, 1)
there exists a distribution QABE′ ∈ (BA⊗HA)⊗(BB⊗
HB)⊗HE′ such that
Λ[QABE′ ] ≤ λ0 , (5)
λ[UAUB QABE′ ⊗ PABE ] > λ0 , (6)
where U is defined in Lemma 5. The size of HE′ is
arbitrary.
Proof. Let n be the smallest integer such that there exist
operations MA : H
⊗n
A → BA and NB : H
⊗n
B → BB
such that λ[MANB P
⊗n
ABE ] > λ0 (following Definition 4).
According to Lemma 5 there are maps M′A,N
′
B such
that MA = UAM′A, NB = UBN
′
B , and the distribution
QABE′ = M′AN
′
B P
⊗(n−1)
ABE has alphabet (BA ⊗ HA) ⊗
(BB ⊗HB) ⊗HE′ , as we want to show. Because Λ is
defined through an optimization (Definition 3), we have
Λ[P
⊗(n−1)
ABE ] ≥ Λ[M
′
AN
′
B P
⊗(n−1)
ABE ] = Λ[QABE′ ] . (7)
The definition of n implies that Λ[P
⊗(n−1)
ABE ] ≤ λ0, which
together with (7), implies (5). Using the properties of
the maps U ,M′,N ′ shown in Lemma 5, one can check
that
UAUB QABE′ ⊗ PABE =MANB P
⊗n
ABE . (8)
Recall that the maps MA,NB are the ones for which
λ[MANB P
⊗n
ABE ] > λ0, which together with (8), implies
(6). ✷
In other words, what Lemma 6 tells is that if a distri-
bution PABE is distillable, then it can activate the se-
crecy of another distribution QABE . Here by activation
we mean enhancement of the maximal extractable secret
bit fraction Λ[·]. The important point is that Alice’s and
Bob’s alphabets in QABE are bounded. Unfortunately,
Lemma 6 does not tell anything about the size of Eve’s
alphabet in QABE′ , that is HE′ , but this problem will
later sort out itself.
IV. NON-DISTILLABILITY CRITERION
In order to certify that a given distribution GABE ∈
HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE is undistillable, it suffices to obtain
a contradiction between the inequalities (5) and (6).
However, the characterization of the set of distributions
QABE′ ∈ (BA ⊗HA) ⊗ (BB ⊗HB) ⊗HE′ , where the
size ofHE′ is arbitrary, satisfying λ[MANBQABE′ ] ≤ λ0
for any pair of maps MA,NB is not available. Instead,
we consider a larger (but simpler) set. For any given
finite family of pairs of maps F = {(MiA,N
i
B) : i =
1, . . .M}, we consider the set of distributions which sat-
isfy λ[MiAN
i
BQABE′ ] ≤ λ0 for i = 1, . . .M . In what
follows we particularize to λ0 = 1/2, although different
criteria could be obtained for different values of λ0. An-
other big simplification is to write the inequalities (5)
and (6) as “almost”-linear in the vector QABE′ . If we
denote by e the variable of HE , and by e
′ the variable
of HE′ , we can write (5) and (6) as
2
∑
e′,e
min
a∈{0,1}
{
[UAUB QABE′ ⊗GABE ](a, a, e
′, e)
}
−
1
2
∑
a,b,e′,e
[UAUB QABE′ ⊗GABE ](a, b, e
′, e) > 0 (9)
2
∑
e′
min
a∈{0,1}
{
[MiAN
i
B QABE′ ](a, a, e
′)
}
−
1
2
∑
a,b,e′
[MiAM
i
B QABE′ ](a, b, e
′) ≤ 0 , (10)
for i = 1, . . .M . This is obtained by using the explicit
form of λ[·] given in (2), and setting λ0 = 1/2.
Denote by d the dimension of HE . In (9) and (10) the
summation over e runs over d values, while the summa-
tion over e′ is unbounded (like the dimension of HE′).
In what follows we transform the summation over e′ into
one over 2d+M values. For each e = 1, . . . d, define the
function
re(e
′) =
{
0 if
∑
a(−1)
a[UAUBQABE′ ⊗GABE ](a, a, e′, e) < 0
1 if
∑
a(−1)
a[UAUBQABE′ ⊗GABE ](a, a, e′, e) > 0
for all e′. Analogously, for each i = 1, . . .M define the
function
si(e
′) =
{
0 if
∑
a(−1)
a[MiAN
i
BQABE′ ](a, a, e
′) < 0
1 if
∑
a(−1)
a[MiAN
i
BQABE′ ](a, a, e
′) > 0
for all e′. Using these definitions we can write, for any
value of e, i, e′,
min
a∈{0,1}
{
[UAUB QABE′ ⊗GABE ](a, a, e
′, e)
}
= [UAUB QABE′ ⊗GABE ](re(e
′), re(e
′), e′, e) , (11)
min
a∈{0,1}
{
[MiAM
i
B QABE′ ](a, a, e
′)
}
= [MiAM
i
B QABE′ ](si(e
′), si(e
′), e′) , (12)
which allows to get rid of the min-functions in (9) and
(10). Let us define the new variable k in the following
way
k(e′) = (r0(e
′), r1(e
′), . . . rd(e
′), s1(e
′), . . . sM (e
′)), (13)
4which has the natural distribution and correlations with
A,B,
QABK(a, b,k0) =
∑
e′:k(e′)=k0
QABE′(a, b, e
′) . (14)
This allows to write the identities
∑
e′,e
min
a∈{0,1}
{
[UAUB QABE′ ⊗GABE ](a, a, e
′, e)
}
=
∑
k,e
[UAUB QABK ⊗GABE ](ke, ke,k, e) , (15)
∑
e′
min
a∈{0,1}
{
[MiAM
i
B QABE′ ](a, a, e
′)
}
=
∑
k
[MiAM
i
B QABK ](kd+i, kd+i,k) , (16)
where we have used the fact that when {x0 ≤ x1 and
y0 ≤ y1} or {x0 ≥ x1 and y0 ≥ y1} the equality
min{x0, x1}+min{y0, y1} = min{x0+y0, x1+y1} (17)
holds. After grouping the different values of e′ as in (14),
we only need to consider distributions QABK where the
variable k runs over 2d+M different values. However, the
new (bounded in size) distribution QABK must satisfy
the constraints
∑
a
(−1)a[UAUBQABK ⊗GABE ](ke ⊕ a, ke ⊕ a,k, e) < 0 ,
∑
a
(−1)a[MiAM
i
BQABK ](kd+i ⊕ a, kd+i ⊕ a,k) < 0 ,
for all e, i,k.
Now everything is finite. QABK is a vector from the
space (dimHA × dimHB × 2d+M+2) with non-negative
components, that is QABK(a, b,k) ≥ 0 for all a, b,k.
Hence, the set of allowed distributions QABK is charac-
terized by a finite set of linear inequalities. Then, maxi-
mizing the left-hand side of (9) is a linear programming
problem.
LINEAR PROGRAMMING: (18)
[If the maximum is zero then GABE is undistillable.]
max
QABK
∑
k,e
(
4[UAUB QABK ⊗GABE ](ke, ke,k, e)−
−
∑
a,b
[UAUB QABK ⊗GABE ](a, b,k, e)
)
with constrains
4
∑
k
[MiAM
i
B QABK ](kd+i, kd+i,k)−
−
∑
a,b,k
[MiAM
i
B QABK ](a, b,k) ≤ 0 ,
∑
a
(−1)a[UAUB QABK ⊗GABE ](ke ⊕ a, ke ⊕ a,k, e) < 0 ,
∑
a
(−1)a[MiAM
i
B QABK ](kd+i ⊕ a, kd+i ⊕ a,k) < 0 ,
∑
a,b,k
QABK(a, b,k) = 1
QABK(a, b,k) ≥ 0 ,
for all i = 1, . . .M , all k ∈ {0, 1}d+M , and all a, b ∈
{0, 1} in the last inequality.
If the given distribution GABE has rational coeffi-
cients, the above linear programming can be solved by
exact methods like the simplex algorithm [6]. Or by
quasi-exact methods like the interior point algorithm [4],
whose solution can always be certified exactly. The last
method is faster, and hence can deal with larger values
of M .
A key feature of this method is to choose a suitable
family F of pairs of maps. The larger the size of this
family (M) the more constrains on the above maximiza-
tion, and more chances to get the maximum equal to
zero.
V. REMARKS
If the maximum of the linear programming (18) is zero
then we know for sure that GABE is undistillable. But
actually, we know something much stronger: GABE can-
not activate any other non-distillable distribution. In
other words, the correlations in GABE are completely
useless.
Lemma 7. Let the distribution GABE be such that
the maximum of the linear programming (18) is zero. If
PABE is a non-distillable distribution, then the tensor-
product PABE ⊗GABE is also non-distillable.
Proof. By assumption, for any distribution QABE such
that Λ[QABE] ≤ 1/2 we have Λ[QABE ⊗ GABE ] ≤ 1/2.
In particular, if we chose QABE = P
⊗n
ABE we have
5Λ[P⊗nABE⊗GABE ] ≤ 1/2, for any n. But this also implies
Λ[(P⊗nABE ⊗ GABE) ⊗ GABE ] ≤ 1/2, and proceeding by
induction, we obtain Λ[(PABE ⊗GABE)⊗n] ≤ 1/2. ✷
An interesting possibility is that for any distribution
GABE with positive secrecy cost all linear programming
problems (18) have a larger than zero maximum. This
would imply that our criterion does not detect any non-
distillable distribution, and hence it is useless. But this
would also imply that any distribution GABE with posi-
tive secrecy cost (even though it may be non-distillable)
can increase the quality of the secret bits distilled from a
single copy of another distribution QABE. Actually, an
analog of the last statement is true in the quantum case
[14, 15]. That is, all entangled states (of any number
of parties) can increase the quality of the entanglement
that can be distilled from a single copy of another state.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented the first criterion
which certifies that a given distribution GABE has no
distillable key. In fact, this method consists on show-
ing that GABE does not improve the key content of any
other distribution (i.e., it does not bring the maximally
extractable secret bit fraction above 1/2).
It is an open question whether all correlations with
positive secrecy content can increase the secrecy of other
correlations. This very interesting feature of secret cor-
relations would invalidate the criterion presented here.
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly: does our tech-
nique have a quantum analogue, which could be used to
prove the existence of entangled quantum states that do
not contain secret key? This would present a comple-
ment to the work by Horodecki et al. [10], who show the
existence of bound entangled states that do nevertheless
contain secret key: perhaps there exists completely bound
entanglement which neither contains distillable key nor
enhances key content of other states.
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